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FROM SELFIES TO SHACKLES:
WHY THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE ABLE TO SEARCH YOUR
CELL PHONE WITHOUT A WARRANT
by Rochelle Brunot
Can youi lieir me now? This phrase is
inv o llan jut i Verizon commercial catch
phirase it lia een said by almost everyone
with a cell phone at one time or another. Cell
phones are everywhere, and most individuals
have an abundance of personal information on
their phone. Consequently, if the police are
able to look through an individual's phone, they
will have instant access to a significant amount
of personal information. Looking through an
individual's cell phone without a warrant is un-
doubtedly an invasion of privacy and presents
clear Fourth Amendment issues. However, this
invasion of privacy may be permissible when
the cell phone search falls under one of the ex-
ceptions to the general warrant requirement.
The following facts describe a situation where
the police used their search incident to arrest
authority to search through an arrestee's phone
without a warrant.
I. A Proposed Scenario: Recitation of Facts
from United States v. Wuriel
Consider the following set of facts: a
motorist pulls into a parking lot, picks up an-
other person, and engages in what appears to
be a drug sale. Police officers involved in rou-
tine surveillance of the area stop the motorist
immediately after observing this interaction.
When the officers search his car, they find two
1 See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013 WL 4404658 (U.S. Aug.
15, 2013) (No. 13-212) (the fact pattern created by the author
in this section is based generally on the circumstances found
in Wurie).
plastic baggies with crack cocaine inside his
pocket. The motorist tells the officers he got
the drugs from "B," who sells crack.
The police subsequently arrest the mo-
torist after he allegedly engaged in what the of-
ficers suspect is a drug deal. While at the station
the police seize two cell phones, a set of keys,
and a lump sum of cash. Before completing the
booking process, however, they notice that one
of the arrestee's phones is repeatedly receiving
calls from a number identified as "my house."
The contact name and phone number are in
plain view. After five minutes of repeated calls,
the officers look through the arrestee's call log,
without consent. The police identify the phone
number associated with "my house" by looking
at the call logs and pressing one additional but-
ton. When the officers type the phone number
into the online white pages, they are then able
to track down the address that coincides with
that phone number.
The officers advise the man of his Mi-
randa rights, which he waives, and then subse-
quently question him further: they ask him if
he lives at the South Boston address associated
with the "my house" number. He denies living
at that address in South Boston. Skeptical of
his story, the officers take the keys they found
and go to the address associated with the "my
house" phone number. When they arrive at the
house, they notice that the mailboxes contain
"his name along with another person's." The
officers enter the house to "freeze" the scene
Fall 2013 Washington College of Law 89
1
Brunot: From Selfies to Shackles: Why the Government May Be Able to Searc
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
Criminal Law Practitioner
while they obtain a search warrant. After ob-
taining the search warrant, the officers search
the house and find 215 grams of crack, a fire-
arm, ammunition, four bags of marijuana, drug
paraphernalia, and S250 in cash. Officers sub-
sequently charge the arrestee with intent to
distribute, distributing cocaine base, and being
a felon in possession of a firearm and ammuni-
tion.
The main question in the aforemen-
tioned scenario, which essentially mirrors the
facts of UnitedStates v'. Wurie, is whether the po-
lice had the authority to look through the ar-
restee's cell phone specifically his call log and
contact information without consent. Neither
party disputes that the police lawfully arrested
the individual and could search him pursuant
to that lawful arrest. What is also undisputed is
that looking through his cell phone constituted
a search. The question that remains, however,
is whether the officers could actually search
through the cell phone as part of a search inci-
dent to arrest? Does seeing a specific number
in plain view repeatedly ring on a cell phone
provide sufficient justification for a warrantless
search incident to arrest?
The First Circuit Court of Appeals an-
swered this question in the negative, holding
that police do not have the authority to search
through a suspect's cell phone without a war-
rant, simply based on their power to conduct a
search incident to arrest.2 The First Circuit, in
reversing the lower court's decision, reasoned
that the government did not present enough
evidence to show a search of a cell phone was
necessary to either protect officer safety or to
prevent the destruction of evidence.' The gov-
ernment appealed and petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for review.4 If cert is
granted, the Supreme Court's holding on this
issue would inevitably lead to changes in law
enforcement procedure, and would help to
clarify what degree of privacy citizens can ex-
2 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 14 (quoting Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009)).
3 Id. at 12.
4 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1.
pect in their cell phones.
II. History of Search and Seizure Laws
The Fourth Amendment established
broad protections against unreasonable search
and seizure. The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment re-
quirements to mean that any search without a
warrant is presumptively unreasonable." Be-
fore the search of a person or place can be
conducted, a neutral judge or magistrate must
determine there is probable cause to search in
a particular location ors a particular person.6
Though any search without a warrant is pre-
sumptively unreasonable, the Court has carved
out numerous exceptions to this requirement.
One exception to the warrant requirement is a
search of an individual incident to his arrest;
however, the definition of what constitutes this
type of search has expanded over time. With
new developments and changing technology,
the boundaries of this doctrine have become
particularly unclear.
Throughout the years, the Supreme
Court has examined the doctrine of search
incident to arrest in several cases and cre-
ated rules that define this type of search. In
Chimel v'. Calfornia, the Court found that while
a search incident to arrest was permissible, the
limited search authority did not permit officers
to search a suspect's entire house.' The Court
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (regarding reasonableness
and the warrant requirement); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (noting that searches conducted without
a warrant have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause") (quoting Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
6 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (noting that the most
basic constitutional rule is that searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject
to only a few exceptions).
7 See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)
(regarding the exigent circumstances exception); Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 465-471 (1971) (regarding the plain view exception).
8 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated
by Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011).
9 See id. at 768 (noting that the scope of the search
90 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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concluded that a search incident to arrest was
limited to the "grab" area of a suspect because
the primary reason for allowing this type of war-
rantless search was to ensure officer safety.10 In
United States . Robinson," the Court expanded
the boundaries of this authority to include a
search inside the pocket of a suspect after an
arrest, even though the officer knew the object
was not a weapon. 12 The Court reasoned such
a search is permissible because the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine is necessary to prevent
suspects from destroying evidence." Thus, if
an individual is lawfully arrested, the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless search of
the individual, with no additional justification
required.1 4
Over the years, the type of search per-
missible under the search incident to arrest
doctrine continued to expand; in 1974 the
Court found that a search incident to arrest
did not have to occur immediately at the time
of arrest. In United States . Edwards,"' officers
searched a suspect's clothes after arresting the
suspect and seizing his clothes.1 The Court
deemed the search reasonable because the
search would have been legal if conducted at
the time of the arrest." The Supreme Court's
most recent case regarding search incident to
arrest dealt with the search of a car and, unlike
previous decisions, seemed to limit the doctri-
nal scope with respect to the search of auto-
mobiles. In Arizona 9. Gant," the Court found
that a search of a car incident to arrest of the
motorist operating it is only permissible when
the suspect is not restrained by officers and is
extended beyond the scope of the area where a petitioner could
have obtained a weapon or where officers could find evidence
that could be used against him).
10 Id. at 764.
11 See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
12 Id. at 235.
13 Id. at 234 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960)).
14 Id. at 235.
15 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
16 Id. at 801-802.
17 Id. at 806.
18 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
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within reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment of the car. 9 A limited search is war-
ranted in such cases to prevent the destruction
of evidence and to promote officer safety, but
these two concerns are not present if the sus-
pect cannot reach into the car.20
While these rules regarding the search
incident to arrest doctrine are firmly estab-
lished, the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed how the doctrine applies to cell phones.
Though the doctrine permits officers to search
a person or car for a cell phone, it does not
state the limits, if any, placed on officers when
looking through the contents of that phone, a
device that, in this day and age, often contains
personal, private information.
III. Search Incident to Arrest and Cell
Phone Searches
In Wurie, the First Circuit held that of-
ficers must obtain a warrant to search contents
of a suspect's cell phone.21 While the search to
find a cell phone was permissible, the subse-
quent search through the contents of the cell
phone required more than the power autho-
rized under the search incident to arrest doc-
trine; the First Circuit reasoned that searching
a cell phone's contents did not relate to offi-
cer safety or to the preservation of evidence.22
Though the court expressed concern that the
contents of a cell phone could be remotely de-
stroyed, the court went on to list several tech-
niques officers could use to prevent this de-
struction. 23 In Wurie, the officers simply looked
19 Id. at 343 (applying the rationale regarding search
incident to arrest from Chimel, 395 U.S. 752). The passenger
component of the car includes the entire interior of the car.
20 Id. at 339 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 367-68 (1964)).
21 See Wurie, 728 E3d at 12 (asserting that warrantless
cell phone data searches are categorically unlawful under the
search- incident- to- arrest exception).
22 See id. at 9-11 (stating that the cell phone can be
inspected to ensure that it is not actually a weapon, but no
further search on the cell phone should be permitted).
23 See id. at 11 (suggesting officers could simply remove
the battery from the phone or place the phone in a Faraday box
which would shield the phone from external electromagnetic
radiation).
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through the call log, a less invasive intrusion
than a search of text messages, photographs, or
emails; however, the rule applies equally to all
cell phone searches in the First Circuit; as stat-
ed by the court in its opinion, it is necessary for
all cell phone searches to be governed by the
same rule, without regard for the invasiveness
of the search.24
In its petition to the Supreme Court in
United States . Wurie, the government argued
that the power given to officers for a search in-
cident to an arrest should be defined broadly
because not only is the search premised on
safety and evidentiary concerns, but there is
also a diminished expectation of privacy.25 The
government argued that when a cell phone is
found as part of a legitimate search incident to
arrest, case law clearly allows for the phone to
be searched.2 6 Cell phones are not unique in
that they are the only items that store personal,
private information. Rather, there are other
items an individual can have on their person
that would contain such personal informa-
tion.21
Further, the government argued that not
going through cell phones could potentially
lead to the destruction of crucial evidence.28
The government analogized the search of an
individual's cell phone to the permissible buc-
cal DNA swab the Court recently permitted in
Maryland Q. King.2 9 Both types of searches can
24 Id. at 13.
25 Brief for Petitioner at 11 -12, United States v. Wurie,
2013 WL 4404658 (2013) (No. 13-212) (noting the prior
treatment of safety, evidence preservation, and diminished
expectation of privacy in Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; and Edwards,
425 U.S. 800).
26 Id. at 14 (asserting the validity of such searches based
on Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; and Edwards, 425 U.S. 800).
27 Id. at 16.
28 Id. at 15 (noting that some remote-wiping techniques
exist which allow co-conspirators to wipe data from cell
phones).
29 See id. at 13-14 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013)) ("[The] constitutionality of a search
incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is
any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or
evidence.").
provide identifying information to the police. 0
Consequently, the government disagreed with
the First Circuit's blanket rule that cell phones
found in a search incident to arrest may not be
searched without a warrant. Part of the govern-
ment's argument was based on the connection
between cell phone use and drug transactions,
and that having a blanket rule would hinder of-
ficers' ability to investigate crimes.31
The following state and federal cases
provide reasons for allowing and disallowing
the search of cell phones seized incident to an
arrest.
IV The Current Circuit Split: Arguments
For and Against the Warrantless Search of
Cell Phones
A. Arguments and Cases in Support
of the Warrantless Search
The Seventh Circuit upheld the search
of a cell phone in UnitedStates v'. Flores-Lopez.32
In that case, law enforcement used an informant
to buy drugs from a drug dealer, who received
his drugs from the defendant. The police were
able to overhear a conversation between the
drug dealer and the defendant organizing a de-
livery of drugs at a specific garage; officers then
arrested the defendant in front of the garage
where the drug delivery was to take place. In
a subsequent search of the defendant and his
truck, the officers discovered and seized two
cell phones. The officers searched one of the
cell phones for its number, which they used to
subpoena three months of the phone's call his-
tory33
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
though an individual's cell phone may be a
useful source for obtaining incriminating in-
30 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 25, at 19 (quoting
King, 133 S. Ct at 1972) ("Like a DNA test, the search of a cell
phone's call log can provide 'metrics of identification used to
connect the arrestee with his or her public person, as reflected
in records of his or her actions that are available to the
police.").
31 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 25, at 25.
32 670 E3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
33 Id. at 804 (facts of Flores-Lopez described).
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formation, it will also have a lot of private in-
formation, thus making a search of a cell phone
a greater privacy invasion than the search of a
conventional container. Because of technologi-
cal advances, a cell phone is more analogous
to a computer than a simple container. The
court also noted that the officers could have
taken some steps to avoid the cell phone's data
from being remotely wiped, but nevertheless
concluded that the risk of evidence destruction
outweighed the minimally intrusive search.
Consequently, the court found the search to be
lawful because the officers simply wanted to
look through the cell phone to find the phone's
number.3 4
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit upheld a
warrantless search of a cell phone seized pur-
suant to a search incident to arrest. In United
States . Murphy,3" an officer initiated a traffic
stop when he observed a car driving down the
road at about ninety-five miles per hour." None
of the occupants of the car provided proper
identification when asked and all were sub-
sequently arrested for providing officers with
false names and for obstruction of justice." Af-
ter all of the suspects in the car were arrested,
the officers conducted a thorough search of the
vehicle and found a cell phone." Law enforce-
ment agents sent the phone to the Drug En-
forcement Agency for processing and an exam-
ination revealed several texts from a man later
identified as a drug dealer. This dealer was in-
terviewed and identified the defendant as his
drug supplier.
The Fourth Circuit allowed the search of
the phone, basing the validity of the search on
the need to preserve evidence.'9 The court re-
lied on another Fourth Circuit opinion, which
held that it was permissible for officers to re-
trieve text messages pursuant to a search inci-
dent to arrest.40 In addition, the court was not
34 Id. at 810.
35 522 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
36 Id. at 407.
37 Id. at 407-08.
38 Id. at 408-09.
39 Id. at 411.
40 United States v. Young. 278 Fed. Appx. 242, 245-46
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persuaded by Murphy's argument that a cell
phone should only be searched if the phone
has a small storage capacity, as it would be too
burdensome to require officers to determine
the exact storage capacity for each phone be-
fore a search could be conducted. 1 It opined
that such a rule would be unworkable and un-
reasonable. Accordingly, the warrantless search
of the cell phone was permissible.42
The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the
issue of a cell phone search, and has found it
to be permissible when the phone was seized
pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest.4 3
In United States 9. Finley, police officers took
two suspects into custody after conducting a
controlled buy of methamphetamines. Offi-
cers seized the defendant's phone incident to
arrest. While questioning the defendant, offi-
cers looked through call records and text mes-
sages on the phone, and the content was then
used to confront the defendant during ques-
tioning.45
The court in Finley allowed the search
of the phone because the phone had been law-
fully seized. The court first determined that
though the defendant's employer issued the
cell phone, he did have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the phone's contents.46 How-
ever, the phone was lawfully seized pursuant
to a search incident to arrest and this type of
search is permissible for not only weapons, but
also for evidence. Consequently, because the
phone was seized with valid authority the war-
rantless search of the phone was permissible.
(4th Cir. 2008).
41 Murphy, 522 E3d at 411.
42 Id. at 412.
43 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir.
2007).
44 Id. at 254 (noting that although the defendant's phone
was issued through his work, he was allowed to use the phone
for personal reasons as well).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 259 (holding that the defendant took normal
precautions to maintain his privacy interest in the cell phone
even if the phone was not password protected).
47 Id. at 259-60.
48 Id. at 260.
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In addition to the decisions of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, 4 several
state courts have also upheld the search of a
suspect's cell phone incident to arrest, includ-
ing the Massachusetts Supreme Court.o In
Phifer, the court held that the limited search of
the defendant's call list was valid." The court
found the officers had reason to believe the
call list would contain evidence because the of-
ficers had seen the defendant using the phone
to facilitate a drug transaction.52 The court also
acknowledged that the search must be reason-
able. Reasonableness is determined by balanc-
ing the particular search against the invasion
of privacy.5" The decision by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court is particularly important as it
stands in direct opposition to the Wurie deci-
sion from the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
As a consequence of this conflict, officers
working in Massachusetts are left with conflict-
ing guidance on the issue.
Further, the Georgia Supreme Court
found the search of a defendant's cell phone to
be permissible.5 4 In Hawkins 9. Georgia, the de-
fendant set up a buy with an undercover officer
to purchase drugs."" The undercover officer ar-
rived at the specified location and observed the
defendant enter data in her phone; the under-
cover officer then received a text from the de-
fendant saying she had arrived. The cell phone
was found in the defendant's purse pursuant
to a search incident to arrest, and the officer
found the text messages the defendant had ex-
changed with the undercover officer. The pros-
ecution subsequently used this text message
evidence in court.
49 See Silvan v. Briggs, 309 Fed. Appx. 216, 225
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a warrantless search for child
protective purposes falls under the exigent circumstance
exception).
50 Massachusetts v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 211-12
(2012); see also Massachusetts v. Berry, 979 N.E.2d 218, 219-23
(2012) (following the court in Phifer and reversing defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence found from a cell phone).
51 Phifer, 979 N.E.2d at 215-16.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 216 (suggesting that a more invasive search
into the cell phone may require a different assessment).
54 Hawkins v. Georgia, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925-26 (2012).
55 Id. at 925.
The Georgia Supreme Court analo-
gized a cell phone seized incident to arrest to a
search of a container. It concluded that, simi-
lar to the rule regarding a traditional container,
which permits a search for tangible evidence,
a cell phone could also be searched." Though
a cell phone may contain personal informa-
tion, it may also contain evidence of the crime
for which the suspect has been arrested. The
potentially high volume of information that
could be stored on a phone should not con-
trol whether the search should be permissible.
Nevertheless, it is clear the court did not en-
dorse officers going on a fishing expedition to
search through the entire phone for evidence.7
The search must be narrow in scope; thus, if
the officer is searching for text messages the of-
ficer cannot look through the photographs or
internet browsing history.
The California Supreme Court also up-
held the search of a cell phone found incident
to arrest."9 In California v. Diaz, the defendant
participated in a controlled buy with a confi-
dential informant.60 The officers listened to
the controlled buy via a wire, then stopped the
defendant, and found drugs on him. The of-
ficers then looked through the defendant's cell
phone and found a text message that read "6
4 SO."" From the officer's previous experience
working drug cases, he knew this text message
indicated a sale of six Ecstasy pills for eighty
dollars.62
The California Supreme Court found
the cell phone could be considered personal
property immediately associated with the de-
fendant; because the contents of the cell phone
were not deemed distinguishable from the ar-
restee's person, the warrantless search was per-
missible." Like the Georgia Supreme Court,
56 Id. at 926.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
60 Id. at 502.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 502-03.
63 Id. at 505, 509- 10.
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the California Supreme Court did not find the
sheer quantity of information that could be
found on a cell phone to be determinative of
whether the search was permissible. 4 More-
over, allowing searches based on the storage ca-
pacity of the cell phone would be an unwork-
able rule for the officers and the courts, as has
been found by other courts. 5
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals
upheld the search of a defendant's cell phone
in Sinclair v. Maryland." Here, the defendant
was arrested for an armed carjacking, and a cell
phone was recovered following a search inci-
dent to arrest." The officers, within minutes
of the arrest, looked at the screensaver and saw
a photograph that matched the rims from the
victim's car." Before discussing the specific
facts of the case, the court reiterated that be-
cause the cell phone had an enormous amount
of data, a cell phone could not be evaluated in
the same way as other items seized pursuant
to a search incident to arrest.'9 Nevertheless,
the court admitted the screensaver and photo-
graphic evidence at trial because it was direct
evidence of the crime, seized during a limited
and immediate search.70
B. Arguments and Cases Against the
Warrantless Search
In every challenge to the warrantless
search of the cell phone, the defense has ac-
knowledged that the search for the cell phone
was allowed, but contended that the search
through the cell phone's contents was not.
While it appears that the First Circuit is the
only Circuit Court of Appeals to hold a warrant
is required for the search of a cell phone, many
lower state and federal courts using similar rea
64 See id. at 508 (finding the search was not
presumptively unreasonable because of the storage capacity of
the phone).
65 Id. at 508.
66 Sinclair v. State, 214 Md. App. 309, 76 A.3d 442, 454
(Md. 2013).
67 Id. at 446-47.
68 Id. at 447.
69 Id. at 453.
70 Id. at 454.
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soning as the First Circuit have also found the
warrantless search improper.71
In Smallwood . Florida, a man was ar-
rested for armed robbery of a convenience
store. 72 When the defendant was arrested, his
cell phone was seized incident to that arrest;
however, the officer did not mention the seized
cell phone or mention the data observed on the
cell phone in his report." More than a year
after the arrest, but before the trial started, the
officer told the prosecutor he had searched the
phone and found several incriminating photo-
graphs.
In deciding Smallwood, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the Supreme Court's
decision in United States 9. Robinson,' allowing
the search incident to arrest of a suspect's ciga-
rette pack, was not applicable to the search of
an electronic device found incident to an ar-
rest." The Robinson case did not involve a cell
phone, and the court noted that at the time that
case was decided, in 1973, cell phones were
not commonly used nor did they carry the im-
mense amount of information they do now.
The court also expressed concern about allow-
ing law enforcement to have access to this im-
mense amount of information without a war-
rant." Accordingly, the court distinguished a
cell phone from the cigarette pack searched in
Robinson. 9
71 See Smallwood v. Florida, 113 So. 3d 724, 738 (Fla.
2013); Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010); United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-
CT-48, 2013 WL 5945802, at *12 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013); United
States v. Aispuro, No. 13-10036-01 -MLB, 2013 WL 3820017, at
*13-14 (D. Kan. July 24, 2013); United States v. McGhee, No.
8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009);
United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at
*11 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
72 Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 726.
73 Id. at 726-27.
74 Id. at 727.
75 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
76 Id. at 730.
77 Id. at 731-32.
78 See id. at 732 (noting that the "most private and
secret personal information and data is contained in or
accessed through small portable electronic devices").
79 Id.
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Instead, the court found that the facts
of Arizona 9. Gant were more applicable to this
case.80 The court stated that the officer was al-
lowed to remove the cell phone from the de-
fendant's person, but once the device was
no longer in the defendant's possession, the
search of the phone was not permitted because
the phone could not be used as a weapon nor
could the defendant destroy any evidence on
the phone." The absence of evidence to indi-
cate those two interests required the officers to
get a warrant before searching the phone. 82
Similarly, in Ohio 9. Smith, a woman who
was taken to a hospital for a drug overdose
agreed to call her drug dealer to arrange a drug
buy." The woman identified the defendant as
her drug dealer, and the officers showed up at
the buy and arrested him." During the search
they found a cell phone on his person." While
it is not clear when exactly the defendant's
phone was searched, at some point the officers
did search the call records and confirmed that
he was the individual the woman from the hos-
pital called to arrange the drug buy.6
The court disagreed with the character-
ization of a cell phone as analogous to a con-
tainer because of the wealth of personal in-
formation that can be stored on the phone.
Again, the court was concerned about allowing
the warrantless search of a cell phone because
it would give the police access to this immense
amount of personal information." Though a
cell phone is not the same as a computer, it car-
ries with it a higher level a privacy interest than
80 Id. at 735. In Arizona v. Gant, the Court found that
the search incident to arrest was not permissible because the
arrestee was separated from the item or thing to be searched.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 950-51.
87 Id. at 954.
88 See id. (discussing even though the defendant had
a standard cell phone, it still had other capabilities besides
making phone calls, including text messaging and camera
capabilities).
the typical container an individual may carry.9
Further, the police can take steps to ensure the
information from the phone is not destroyed. 0
The court rejected the state's argument that a
search of the cell phone was necessary because
the call records could be deleted, since the re-
cords could be obtained by the cell phone ser-
vice provider.9 ' In addition, the circumstanc-
es in this case did not justify the warrantless
search of the cell phone in order to determine
the identity of the suspect.92
In UnitedStates v(. Mayo, an officer stopped
a vehicle because he suspected the driver was
on his cell phone in violation of Vermont law.93
After the stop was initiated, the officer asked
for consent to search the vehicle, but when con-
sent was not given, the officer stated he would
simply get a search warrant.94 The defendant
then allowed the officer to search the vehicle,
and drugs and paraphernalia were found in the
car. In addition, a cell phone was seized, and
the contents of the phone were downloaded for
officer use, including the phone number, con-
tacts lists, texts, call records, and other images.95
The Vermont court found that because
cell phones can connect to the Internet, the
phones have an almost unlimited storage ca-
pacity and, thus, do not fit within the contain-
er doctrine.9' It instead makes more sense to
compare cell phones to computers.9 ' In this
particular case, the court found the extreme in-
vasive nature of the search was not justified as
the government failed to demonstrate the need
for the search.9' Accordingly, the court created
a bright-line rule finding that because of the
technological advances in cell phones a war-
89 Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 955-56.
92 Id. at 956.
93 Mayo, 2013 WL 5945802, at *1.
94 Id. at *2.
95 In Vermont, consent or a warrant is needed to search
a cell phone, but for federal investigations the search incident
to arrest authority is sufficient. Id.
96 Id. at *8.
97 Id. at *9.
98 Id. at*1l.
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rant is required before a search.99
In United States a. Aispuro, a federal dis-
trict court in Kansas granted a defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence found af-
ter a search was done of the contents of his
phone.100 Though the phone was found as part
of a search incident to arrest, the phone's con-
tents were downloaded when the phone was
in the officer's custody, and therefore, no risk
of evidence destruction by the defendant ex-
isted.10 1 Further, there was no specific threat
of remote evidence destruction.1 02 As a result,
there was no evidence that exigency existed as
the downloaded contents of the phone was not
searched until five days after it was received. 103
The officers could have asked for a warrant be-
fore examining the information. 104 The court
noted that allowing a warrantless search in this
situation would have been completely contrary
to the reasonable expectation of privacy people
have in their cell phones. Here, the police were
either required to obtain a warrant or to dem-
onstrate the existence of some sort of exigen-
cy.105
In United States 9. McGhee, the defendant
was arrested in January 2009, pursuant to an
arrest warrant, for conspiracy to distribute and
distribution of drugs, though the actual crimes
were committed in March 2008.106 A cell phone
was seized incident to the defendant's arrest,
and the contact list was scanned. The officer
who put the scanned contact list into an FBI
report did not know the arrest warrant was for
a 2008 incident. As in most cases, the court be-
gan by detailing the vast personal information
that cell phones contain and noted that be-
cause of this vast information there is an inher-
99 Id. at *12-13.
100 Aispuro, 2013 WL 3820017, at *15.
101 Id. at *12.
102 Id. at *13.
103 Id. at *14.
104 See id. (finding that getting a warrant is consistent
with exigency circumstances and privacy concerns as cell
phones contain personal data).
105 Id. at *14.
106 McGhee, 2009 WL 2424104, at *1.
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ent expectation of privacy in one's cell phone.1 07
Because the defendant was arrested in January
2009, there was no reason to believe that this
cell phone would still have evidence, almost
a year later, from crimes committed in March
2008. Also, as the cell phone was in the imme-
diate control of the officer, there was no risk of
harm to the officer or risk of evidence destruc-
tion that warranted the search. 108 Accordingly,
the court found the warrantless search of the
phone was not justified. 109
In UnitedStates 9. Park, officers executed
a search warrant on a building in California and
uncovered a marijuana grow operation, and the
defendant was determined to be part of this op-
eration. 110 Though the defendant's cell phone
was not seized as part of a search incident to
his arrest, his phone was placed in evidence
for safekeeping as part of the routine booking
procedure when he was taken to the police sta-
tion. The officers were not clear on when the
search of the phone happened; however, it was
clear that searching cell phones was not part
of the routine booking procedure."' The court
concluded the search of the phone was purely
investigatory and was not conducted pursuant
to the rationales for search incident to arrest,
officer safety, or evidence destruction. 112 Con-
sequently, the search was found to be imper-
missible.'"
V Conclusion
The search of cell phones found inci-
dent to an arrest is not a novel issue. As dem-
onstrated by the cases above, the Supreme
Court has been asked to review a number of
these cases, but has failed to grant certiorari.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari
in United States 9. Wurie because the different
sets of rules that apply in Massachusetts as a
result of the First Circuit's ruling merit review.
107 Id. at *3.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 2007 WL 1521573, at *2.
111 Id. at *2-3.
112 Id. at *8.
113 Id. at *11- 12.
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Moreover, because there are conflicting rulings
among the courts at the state and federal level
across the country, a clear rule on the issue is
needed for officers and suspects alike.
When the Founders drafted the Fourth
Amendment, and the Supreme Court sub-
sequently interpreted its requirements, cell
phones were not yet invented, let alone part of
the consideration for the warrant requirement.
In addition, with ever-advancing technology in
cell phones, more and more personal informa-
tion can be stored on the phone, and law en-
forcement can use that information to investi-
gate and prosecute crimes. With this changing
landscape in mind, it is up to the Court to de-
termine if cell phones require a special con-
sideration. The Court has already interpreted
the Fourth Amendment as requiring differ-
ent rules for the home and car. Therefore, the
Court must determine if a cell phone is more
analogous to a container found in a car, or to a
computer. Further, in determining if a search
should be allowed, the Court will have to bal-
ance privacy interests with law enforcement in-
terests.
Based on the rationales adopted by the
lower courts, the Supreme Court seems to have
three different ways it could rule on Wurie. The
Court could find that the warrantless search of
a cell phone is per se unreasonable, and even
if found pursuant to a search incident to arrest,
a warrant is required. Alternatively, the Court
could hold that when a cell phone is found pur-
suant to a search incident to arrest, the search
is always permissible. Finally, the Court could
also limit what the officers could search for in
the phone and then require a showing of exi-
gency to do a full search of the phone's content
without a warrant.
In the interim, even in jurisdictions
where the search is allowed, prosecutors
should caution law enforcement officers about
doing complete searches of cell phones found
incident to arrest. While the search may be al-
lowed in those jurisdictions, the courts have
often expressed concerns in their opinions
about the abundance of information that can
be found on a cell phone. In addition, usually
when the search has been upheld it is because
the officer conducted a limited search of the
contents of the phone. Nevertheless, defense
attorneys must continue to challenge law en-
forcement's searches of these phones.
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